<big id="xsurv"></big>
    1. <track id="xsurv"></track>

      立即打開
      IPO就是敲詐?這位風投大鱷就是這么想的!

      IPO就是敲詐?這位風投大鱷就是這么想的!

      Shawn Tully 2020年06月19日
      這位傳奇投資人認為,當前的IPO制度很糟糕。

      比爾?格利認為,上市掛牌首日出現的那些轟動的“暴漲”現象標志著年輕公司遭到了利用。圖片來源:David Paul Morris—Getty Images

      在人們印象中,比爾?格利就是一位外表樸實、氣定神閑的硅谷老手。他可以一邊在位于灣區的家中后院閑逛,一邊信手拈來地指導那些科技天才。一個周二的下午晚些時候,我們通過Zoom視頻采訪比爾?格利。身穿栗色耐克T恤、頭戴棒球帽的格利表示,面向年輕公司的上市體系存在弊端,在某個時刻,他決定承擔起修復這一體系的使命。這位投資過Uber、Zillow以及Stitch Fix的Benchmark風險投資人回憶道:“我們當時正在為(軟件供應商)Elastic做股票發行規劃。我們突然意識到,投資銀行給出的股票定價嚴重偏低,股票市值會在上市掛牌首日上漲7000萬美元至8000萬美元?!?

      讓格利感到震驚的是,銀行打算以犧牲包括Benchmark投資者在內的上市公司所有者為代價,為他們寶貴的客戶帶來巨大的即時收益。Benchmark合伙人就此召開了一次緊急會議,確定了一種避免將所有“意外之財”拱手交給華爾街的方法:他們要求投資銀行家允許Benchmark以投行商定的低價購入大量新股。這樣一來,如果掛牌首日的股價如預期般上漲,那些多年來一直為Elastic提供資金的Benchmark原始投資者便可以將這些收益收入囊中。

      格利說:“投行給出的股票定價確實很低。但令人難以置信的是,銀行家拒絕了我們。他們拒絕給我們一席之地,這樣他們就可以為共同基金和對沖基金預留更多股份,從中獲取高額的傭金。這時我才意識到我們成了替罪羊?!笔聦嵶C明,Elastic上市當天股價飆升了94%,由此產生的超過2億美元的收益歸承銷商的客戶所有,包括Benchmark在內的原始投資者以及Elastic公司都拿不到這筆錢。

      也正是因為這樣一個轉折點,這位身材修長的傳奇人物轉而成為了風險投資界倡導上市新平臺的先鋒斗士。他表示:“我早就知道這個上市體系很糟糕,并且我也是防范投行抑價發行IPO的競價機制的忠實擁護者。但Elastic的上市經歷讓我堅定了變革上市程序的信念?!备窭麛嘌?,IPO期間發售股票,或者在諸如此類的股票、債券或大宗商品的銷售流程中,所有的公平程序大多具備兩個基本要素:市場定價、開放平等的投資者購買渠道。

      沿用幾十年的上市體系并不滿足上述任何一條要素。首先,買方和賣方不能自由競價,股票價格由牽頭發行的投資銀行決定。格利說:“銀行希望發行預售時每筆交易都能獲得30比1的超額認購,這就意味著在意向投資者當中,只有3%的投資人能夠獲得購買股票的機會?!便y行給出的股票定價要遠遠低于銀行以及承銷機構認為的首日開盤價,從而創造出這種額外需求。所有基金在承銷階段都拒絕配售,與成群結隊的散戶投資者一起,在掛牌首日蜂擁而至,引發了那些著名的“暴漲”現象。

      “我討厭暴漲?!备窭硎??!巴顿Y銀行總是在說,暴漲是好事,是一種市場活動,并且商業媒體對股價飆升也是一貫大肆吹捧的態度。這太荒謬了。暴漲恰恰是股價被嚴重低估的標志?!彼赋?,華爾街非常擅長將IPO塑造成壯觀的大場面:首席執行官可以在掛牌當天敲響紐約證交所的鐘聲,或者在公司橫幅下歡呼。

      至于營銷和品牌建設,他指出,抑價發行每損失2000萬美元就可以買到四個超級碗廣告。格利表示,用低價來換取銀行全明星分析師承諾的有利報道,這種老式的動機早已不復存在。時任紐約州總檢察長的艾略特?斯皮策于2003年建立的所謂“斯皮策法則”在兩個陣營之間筑起了一堵墻。格利說:“就連與分析師交談,投資銀行家都要求公司要連線律師?!彼硎?,現在新上市的公司希望可以與分析師建立直接關系,而這種關系完全超出了上市公司和投資銀行之間的關系紐帶。

      格利還指出,主導交易的投資銀行聲譽越高,暴漲幅度越大。格利在10月主辦的關于IPO改革的會議上發表演講時指出,縱觀過去10年的IPO,若由高盛銀行作為主承銷商,股價在掛牌日交易中的平均漲幅為33.5%,摩根士丹利緊隨其后,其主導的上市平均漲幅為29.2%。

      華爾街銀行家通常會辯稱,頂級投行之所以能保證掛牌首日的股價取得最大漲幅,原因在于他們可以讓最好的公司上市。其中的原理是這樣的,上市的公司質量越高(高盛和摩根士丹利從中大撈一票),漲幅就越大。在格利看來,這種解釋有點可笑。他說:“這種暴漲是上市的成本。除此之外,你去哪里找這種支付最高費用的最優質客戶?房地產經紀人賣的房子價格最貴,收取的傭金就最高嗎?或者說,評級最高的債券支付的收益率就最高嗎?”有觀點認為,由頂級投資銀行牽頭發行股票往往更有威望,這也遭到了格利的抨擊。承接1997年亞馬遜IPO業務的德意志摩根建富銀行不及高盛或摩根士丹利的聲名在外,但這絲毫不影響亞馬遜的上市前景。格利指出:“上市之后,甚至根本沒有人記得負責IPO發行承銷的投資銀行?!?

      其次,投資銀行幾乎將所有投資者拒之門外,只有極少數投資者有機會在給定IPO中購買股票?!俺袖N商希望讓90%的頂級客戶內部認購?!备窭f?!八麄優?0到15個最大的客戶預留了65%到70%的股份?!笔O碌膭t歸50家規模較小的基金經理客戶所有。同樣,即便是那些被選中的少數投資者,也只得到了他們想要股份的3%。不僅如此,美國其他9000只基金和散戶投資者通常都得不到任何回報。格利表示:“投資銀行故意忽視絕大多數需求?!闭沁@10到15個最有價值的賬戶推動了股票定價。在承銷過程中,那些大基金往往出價最低,為了取悅他們,投資銀行給出的發行價與大基金愿意支付的價格相差無幾。這一定價通常要遠遠低于公開競價中確定的價格。

      哪些客戶能夠獲得最好的服務,其中的決定因素是什么?(或者像一家初創公司的創始人曾經告訴我的那樣,“哪些有錢人得到了營養最豐富的牛奶?”這家初創公司后來成為了1999年規模最大的IPO公司之一。)最高的股份配額給了共同基金和對沖基金,這些基金在投資銀行從事股票、債券和大宗商品交易,向投資銀行支付的傭金最高。佛羅里達大學的金融學教授杰伊?里特是研究上市運作的頂尖學術專家,他說:“這些基金向銀行支付的傭金(或稱為‘軟美元’)要遠遠高于股票或債券交易的實施成本,以此作為銀行讓他們參與抑價IPO的回報?!?

      在格利看來,隨著近期又出現了大量的抑價IPO,上市變革的訴求顯得尤為緊迫。6月前兩周的四筆交易讓這一趨勢愈發明朗化:上市公司因為抑價IPO而損失的金額高達17億美元。壓價程度之高,以及投資者和經理人的損失高達數十億美元,這些都讓人想起了科技股泡沫期間賺得盆滿缽滿的華爾街。他表示:“股市行情一直很火爆,由此也帶來了更多的IPO。但行情火爆也會導致暴漲的空間更大,正因如此,對于投行而言,IPO市場再次成為了一塊大蛋糕?!?

      如何正確看待這些新股上市堆砌的成本非常重要。1999年和2000年是IPO濫發情況最嚴重的兩年,通過壓低科技公司上市股價等手段,華爾街這兩年也分別給客戶帶來了300億美元和370億美元的快速獲利。以這兩年所有交易的美元價值計算,IPO在掛牌首日交易中的平均漲幅為50%??駸嵝星榻Y束后,新股發行量和銀行家提供的折扣幅度大幅縮水。例如,2016年,美國只有75宗IPO,首日交易總漲幅僅為18億美元。

      從2018年開始,勢不可擋的牛市讓新股發行市場再度火熱起來,去年,有112家公司上市,籌集資金總額高達540億美元,堪稱20年來最大資金量。這些公司為了上市而損失的金額總計70億美元。這就意味著華爾街銀行家把上市公司的股票售價調低了17%,對上市公司而言,這無疑是一筆很高的成本,但這仍然遠遠低于科技股泡沫期間華爾街50%的降價拋售。

      今年又出現了大規模的暴漲現象。從6月2日到6月8日,華爾街主導了四宗大型IPO,最后所有這些IPO都獲得了兩位數或三位數的漲幅。ZoomInfo、Warner Music、Shift4 Payments以及Vroom分別上漲了61%、31%、46%和118%。四大上市公司總共籌集了29.4億美元,但在掛牌首日收盤時,售出的股票價值高達46.3億美元。因此,上市的“成本”就花了17億美元,或者說,每籌集一美元就要花費63美分,而公司本可以利用這些資金來償還債務或發展業務。

      在這四宗連續性的IPO之前,2020年還啟動了41宗IPO,其中另有19宗IPO出現了大幅上漲。今年早些時候的那些IPO對于上市公司而言花費的成本更高:籌集資金額為33.24億美元,損失金額就達31億美元。也就是說,每募集一美元,就要損失93美分。截至6月中旬,美國公司通過上市總共獲得了63億美元,而其中48億美元的即時利潤(相當于募集資金的76%)卻拱手交給了承銷商青睞的基金。里特說:“繼2000年科技股泡沫之后,因為IPO而損失的金額又將再創新高?!?

      抑價造成的76%的損失并不是新上市公司的唯一成本。投資銀行通常會收取募集資金總額5%左右的承銷費。華爾街收取的總費用也因此增加了大約3億美元,達到51億美元。今年,遭遇抑價的19家公司(占到了大型IPO的一大半)實際上每募集一美元就要花費80美分。

      更好的上市途徑?

      對里特來說,IPO抑價數量的激增,以及暴漲現象的復蘇,這些可能并不意味著華爾街突然重獲了在科技股泡沫中行使的那種權力。相反,他列舉了今年發揮作用的兩個特殊因素。首先是上市公司中絕大多數都是生物制藥公司。截至6月中旬,19家單日漲幅最大的IPO交易中,有15家公司從事先進治療藥物的開發業務,或是新藥研發軟件供應商,其中包括腫瘤醫學公司Black Diamond、ADC以及和Revolution Medicines。

      里特稱:“生物技術公司的股票很難定價,因為在許多情況下,這些治療藥物要么在試驗過程中就宣告失敗,要么一鳴驚人。因此,考慮到其中的風險,銀行家更容易在承銷中爭取更低的價格?!逼浯?,就6月前兩周在開盤當天出現暴漲的股票而言,銀行家早在幾個月前市場行情不明朗的時候就開始了談判。里特說:“銀行家擅長管理預期。在市場疲軟的形勢下磋談一個較低的價格,通過這種手段,銀行家就可以錨定客戶對于上市合理價格的看法?!币坏┕墒蟹磸?,就像他們在5月和6月初所做的那樣,銀行家可以稍微抬高價格,辯稱他們為客戶籌集了更多資金,同時仍然坐享新一輪樂觀情緒帶來的股價飆升。

      格利致力于用一種排除了傳統IPO這兩大缺點的體系作為上市的替代選擇。他的解決方案既能保證市場價格、杜絕暴漲,同時所有有意向的大小投資者也都可以獲得購買股票的機會。這種解決方案被稱為“直接上市”。直接上市類似于Hambrecht & Quist的聯合創始人威廉?哈姆布雷特推出的“荷蘭式拍賣”平臺。事實上,荷蘭式拍賣上市是自由市場首次背離老式IPO的一種上市程序。和格利一樣,拉里?佩奇和謝爾蓋?布林也是上市程序改革的主要支持者,他們在2004年幫助谷歌上市時就采用了荷蘭式拍賣模式。

      在荷蘭式拍賣上市中,所有潛在投資者都必須登錄IPO主導公司自己的專利軟件。因此,所有基金和個人鏈接到發行網站的操作可能有點繁雜。直接上市也屬于拍賣上市。但直接上市的運作與交易所每天為每只股票設定開盤價的通用程序完全相同。例如,包括Citadel Securities在內的紐約證交所做市商會在交易開始前收集所有出價并詢問訂單,然后找到“市場出清”價格,即每股售價。高于這個價格的競價者買不到任何股票,低于這個價格的競價者則可以順利完成買入訂單。股價最終以該市場價位開盤,這樣就不會因為有大量超額訂單等待買入而出現股價暴漲。

      格利指出:“直接上市的好處在于,每一家基金、以及擁有交易賬戶的任何投資者都可以像下單買入蘋果(Apple)或家得寶(Home Depot)一樣對IPO出價?!?018年5月,Spotify成為第一家直接上市掛牌的公司,這也為第二年采用同樣模式上市的Slack增加了可靠性?!斑@太簡單了?!崩锾卣f?!癝potify和Slake的做市商在IPO中的定價與開盤前的操作與做其他股票沒有任何不同?!?

      到目前為止,直接上市還沒有通過出售新發行的股票來籌集資金。雇員和風險投資人可以出售持有的股票,繼而確定股票的市場價。之后,發行主體可以重返市場,獲得在后續發行中出售的所有新發行股票的全部價值,籌集增長和償還債務所需資金。這些公司能夠在直接上市后以交易確立的全額價值來出售股票,而不是通過投資銀行抑價發行IPO籌集新資金。

      還是那個問題:為什么這么多的公司仍然采用這種效率低、費用高的老式方法上市呢?格利將IPO比作是一場婚禮,特別是那種光鮮亮麗的南部婚禮彌撒。他說:“公司所有者一生也就經歷一兩次上市。他們沒有上市的經驗,也不想承受上市過程中可能出現問題所帶來的那種焦慮感。于是,最簡單的方法就是不要惹惱任何人,一切按照傳統來?!?

      和格利一樣支持直接上市的還有著名投資銀行家弗蘭克?奎特隆、eBay總裁皮埃爾?奧米迪亞等硅谷巨頭。上市程序作為資本市場最后的精英庇護所之一,推動其實現民主化,格利的這一做法無疑是正確的。一邊是傳統,另一邊是公司所有者和雇員得以節約大量成本,以及讓市場發揮作用的基本訴求。當創始人在華爾街敲響公司掛牌上市的鐘聲時,更多的人將敲響姍姍來遲的自由的鐘聲。(財富中文網)

      譯者:Shog

      在人們印象中,比爾?格利就是一位外表樸實、氣定神閑的硅谷老手。他可以一邊在位于灣區的家中后院閑逛,一邊信手拈來地指導那些科技天才。一個周二的下午晚些時候,我們通過Zoom視頻采訪比爾?格利。身穿栗色耐克T恤、頭戴棒球帽的格利表示,面向年輕公司的上市體系存在弊端,在某個時刻,他決定承擔起修復這一體系的使命。這位投資過Uber、Zillow以及Stitch Fix的Benchmark風險投資人回憶道:“我們當時正在為(軟件供應商)Elastic做股票發行規劃。我們突然意識到,投資銀行給出的股票定價嚴重偏低,股票市值會在上市掛牌首日上漲7000萬美元至8000萬美元?!?

      讓格利感到震驚的是,銀行打算以犧牲包括Benchmark投資者在內的上市公司所有者為代價,為他們寶貴的客戶帶來巨大的即時收益。Benchmark合伙人就此召開了一次緊急會議,確定了一種避免將所有“意外之財”拱手交給華爾街的方法:他們要求投資銀行家允許Benchmark以投行商定的低價購入大量新股。這樣一來,如果掛牌首日的股價如預期般上漲,那些多年來一直為Elastic提供資金的Benchmark原始投資者便可以將這些收益收入囊中。

      格利說:“投行給出的股票定價確實很低。但令人難以置信的是,銀行家拒絕了我們。他們拒絕給我們一席之地,這樣他們就可以為共同基金和對沖基金預留更多股份,從中獲取高額的傭金。這時我才意識到我們成了替罪羊?!笔聦嵶C明,Elastic上市當天股價飆升了94%,由此產生的超過2億美元的收益歸承銷商的客戶所有,包括Benchmark在內的原始投資者以及Elastic公司都拿不到這筆錢。

      也正是因為這樣一個轉折點,這位身材修長的傳奇人物轉而成為了風險投資界倡導上市新平臺的先鋒斗士。他表示:“我早就知道這個上市體系很糟糕,并且我也是防范投行抑價發行IPO的競價機制的忠實擁護者。但Elastic的上市經歷讓我堅定了變革上市程序的信念?!备窭麛嘌?,IPO期間發售股票,或者在諸如此類的股票、債券或大宗商品的銷售流程中,所有的公平程序大多具備兩個基本要素:市場定價、開放平等的投資者購買渠道。

      沿用幾十年的上市體系并不滿足上述任何一條要素。首先,買方和賣方不能自由競價,股票價格由牽頭發行的投資銀行決定。格利說:“銀行希望發行預售時每筆交易都能獲得30比1的超額認購,這就意味著在意向投資者當中,只有3%的投資人能夠獲得購買股票的機會?!便y行給出的股票定價要遠遠低于銀行以及承銷機構認為的首日開盤價,從而創造出這種額外需求。所有基金在承銷階段都拒絕配售,與成群結隊的散戶投資者一起,在掛牌首日蜂擁而至,引發了那些著名的“暴漲”現象。

      “我討厭暴漲?!备窭硎??!巴顿Y銀行總是在說,暴漲是好事,是一種市場活動,并且商業媒體對股價飆升也是一貫大肆吹捧的態度。這太荒謬了。暴漲恰恰是股價被嚴重低估的標志?!彼赋?,華爾街非常擅長將IPO塑造成壯觀的大場面:首席執行官可以在掛牌當天敲響紐約證交所的鐘聲,或者在公司橫幅下歡呼。

      至于營銷和品牌建設,他指出,抑價發行每損失2000萬美元就可以買到四個超級碗廣告。格利表示,用低價來換取銀行全明星分析師承諾的有利報道,這種老式的動機早已不復存在。時任紐約州總檢察長的艾略特?斯皮策于2003年建立的所謂“斯皮策法則”在兩個陣營之間筑起了一堵墻。格利說:“就連與分析師交談,投資銀行家都要求公司要連線律師?!彼硎?,現在新上市的公司希望可以與分析師建立直接關系,而這種關系完全超出了上市公司和投資銀行之間的關系紐帶。

      格利還指出,主導交易的投資銀行聲譽越高,暴漲幅度越大。格利在10月主辦的關于IPO改革的會議上發表演講時指出,縱觀過去10年的IPO,若由高盛銀行作為主承銷商,股價在掛牌日交易中的平均漲幅為33.5%,摩根士丹利緊隨其后,其主導的上市平均漲幅為29.2%。

      華爾街銀行家通常會辯稱,頂級投行之所以能保證掛牌首日的股價取得最大漲幅,原因在于他們可以讓最好的公司上市。其中的原理是這樣的,上市的公司質量越高(高盛和摩根士丹利從中大撈一票),漲幅就越大。在格利看來,這種解釋有點可笑。他說:“這種暴漲是上市的成本。除此之外,你去哪里找這種支付最高費用的最優質客戶?房地產經紀人賣的房子價格最貴,收取的傭金就最高嗎?或者說,評級最高的債券支付的收益率就最高嗎?”有觀點認為,由頂級投資銀行牽頭發行股票往往更有威望,這也遭到了格利的抨擊。承接1997年亞馬遜IPO業務的德意志摩根建富銀行不及高盛或摩根士丹利的聲名在外,但這絲毫不影響亞馬遜的上市前景。格利指出:“上市之后,甚至根本沒有人記得負責IPO發行承銷的投資銀行?!?

      其次,投資銀行幾乎將所有投資者拒之門外,只有極少數投資者有機會在給定IPO中購買股票?!俺袖N商希望讓90%的頂級客戶內部認購?!备窭f?!八麄優?0到15個最大的客戶預留了65%到70%的股份?!笔O碌膭t歸50家規模較小的基金經理客戶所有。同樣,即便是那些被選中的少數投資者,也只得到了他們想要股份的3%。不僅如此,美國其他9000只基金和散戶投資者通常都得不到任何回報。格利表示:“投資銀行故意忽視絕大多數需求?!闭沁@10到15個最有價值的賬戶推動了股票定價。在承銷過程中,那些大基金往往出價最低,為了取悅他們,投資銀行給出的發行價與大基金愿意支付的價格相差無幾。這一定價通常要遠遠低于公開競價中確定的價格。

      哪些客戶能夠獲得最好的服務,其中的決定因素是什么?(或者像一家初創公司的創始人曾經告訴我的那樣,“哪些有錢人得到了營養最豐富的牛奶?”這家初創公司后來成為了1999年規模最大的IPO公司之一。)最高的股份配額給了共同基金和對沖基金,這些基金在投資銀行從事股票、債券和大宗商品交易,向投資銀行支付的傭金最高。佛羅里達大學的金融學教授杰伊?里特是研究上市運作的頂尖學術專家,他說:“這些基金向銀行支付的傭金(或稱為‘軟美元’)要遠遠高于股票或債券交易的實施成本,以此作為銀行讓他們參與抑價IPO的回報?!?

      在格利看來,隨著近期又出現了大量的抑價IPO,上市變革的訴求顯得尤為緊迫。6月前兩周的四筆交易讓這一趨勢愈發明朗化:上市公司因為抑價IPO而損失的金額高達17億美元。壓價程度之高,以及投資者和經理人的損失高達數十億美元,這些都讓人想起了科技股泡沫期間賺得盆滿缽滿的華爾街。他表示:“股市行情一直很火爆,由此也帶來了更多的IPO。但行情火爆也會導致暴漲的空間更大,正因如此,對于投行而言,IPO市場再次成為了一塊大蛋糕?!?

      如何正確看待這些新股上市堆砌的成本非常重要。1999年和2000年是IPO濫發情況最嚴重的兩年,通過壓低科技公司上市股價等手段,華爾街這兩年也分別給客戶帶來了300億美元和370億美元的快速獲利。以這兩年所有交易的美元價值計算,IPO在掛牌首日交易中的平均漲幅為50%??駸嵝星榻Y束后,新股發行量和銀行家提供的折扣幅度大幅縮水。例如,2016年,美國只有75宗IPO,首日交易總漲幅僅為18億美元。

      從2018年開始,勢不可擋的牛市讓新股發行市場再度火熱起來,去年,有112家公司上市,籌集資金總額高達540億美元,堪稱20年來最大資金量。這些公司為了上市而損失的金額總計70億美元。這就意味著華爾街銀行家把上市公司的股票售價調低了17%,對上市公司而言,這無疑是一筆很高的成本,但這仍然遠遠低于科技股泡沫期間華爾街50%的降價拋售。

      今年又出現了大規模的暴漲現象。從6月2日到6月8日,華爾街主導了四宗大型IPO,最后所有這些IPO都獲得了兩位數或三位數的漲幅。ZoomInfo、Warner Music、Shift4 Payments以及Vroom分別上漲了61%、31%、46%和118%。四大上市公司總共籌集了29.4億美元,但在掛牌首日收盤時,售出的股票價值高達46.3億美元。因此,上市的“成本”就花了17億美元,或者說,每籌集一美元就要花費63美分,而公司本可以利用這些資金來償還債務或發展業務。

      在這四宗連續性的IPO之前,2020年還啟動了41宗IPO,其中另有19宗IPO出現了大幅上漲。今年早些時候的那些IPO對于上市公司而言花費的成本更高:籌集資金額為33.24億美元,損失金額就達31億美元。也就是說,每募集一美元,就要損失93美分。截至6月中旬,美國公司通過上市總共獲得了63億美元,而其中48億美元的即時利潤(相當于募集資金的76%)卻拱手交給了承銷商青睞的基金。里特說:“繼2000年科技股泡沫之后,因為IPO而損失的金額又將再創新高?!?

      抑價造成的76%的損失并不是新上市公司的唯一成本。投資銀行通常會收取募集資金總額5%左右的承銷費。華爾街收取的總費用也因此增加了大約3億美元,達到51億美元。今年,遭遇抑價的19家公司(占到了大型IPO的一大半)實際上每募集一美元就要花費80美分。

      更好的上市途徑?

      對里特來說,IPO抑價數量的激增,以及暴漲現象的復蘇,這些可能并不意味著華爾街突然重獲了在科技股泡沫中行使的那種權力。相反,他列舉了今年發揮作用的兩個特殊因素。首先是上市公司中絕大多數都是生物制藥公司。截至6月中旬,19家單日漲幅最大的IPO交易中,有15家公司從事先進治療藥物的開發業務,或是新藥研發軟件供應商,其中包括腫瘤醫學公司Black Diamond、ADC以及和Revolution Medicines。

      里特稱:“生物技術公司的股票很難定價,因為在許多情況下,這些治療藥物要么在試驗過程中就宣告失敗,要么一鳴驚人。因此,考慮到其中的風險,銀行家更容易在承銷中爭取更低的價格?!逼浯?,就6月前兩周在開盤當天出現暴漲的股票而言,銀行家早在幾個月前市場行情不明朗的時候就開始了談判。里特說:“銀行家擅長管理預期。在市場疲軟的形勢下磋談一個較低的價格,通過這種手段,銀行家就可以錨定客戶對于上市合理價格的看法?!币坏┕墒蟹磸?,就像他們在5月和6月初所做的那樣,銀行家可以稍微抬高價格,辯稱他們為客戶籌集了更多資金,同時仍然坐享新一輪樂觀情緒帶來的股價飆升。

      格利致力于用一種排除了傳統IPO這兩大缺點的體系作為上市的替代選擇。他的解決方案既能保證市場價格、杜絕暴漲,同時所有有意向的大小投資者也都可以獲得購買股票的機會。這種解決方案被稱為“直接上市”。直接上市類似于Hambrecht & Quist的聯合創始人威廉?哈姆布雷特推出的“荷蘭式拍賣”平臺。事實上,荷蘭式拍賣上市是自由市場首次背離老式IPO的一種上市程序。和格利一樣,拉里?佩奇和謝爾蓋?布林也是上市程序改革的主要支持者,他們在2004年幫助谷歌上市時就采用了荷蘭式拍賣模式。

      在荷蘭式拍賣上市中,所有潛在投資者都必須登錄IPO主導公司自己的專利軟件。因此,所有基金和個人鏈接到發行網站的操作可能有點繁雜。直接上市也屬于拍賣上市。但直接上市的運作與交易所每天為每只股票設定開盤價的通用程序完全相同。例如,包括Citadel Securities在內的紐約證交所做市商會在交易開始前收集所有出價并詢問訂單,然后找到“市場出清”價格,即每股售價。高于這個價格的競價者買不到任何股票,低于這個價格的競價者則可以順利完成買入訂單。股價最終以該市場價位開盤,這樣就不會因為有大量超額訂單等待買入而出現股價暴漲。

      格利指出:“直接上市的好處在于,每一家基金、以及擁有交易賬戶的任何投資者都可以像下單買入蘋果(Apple)或家得寶(Home Depot)一樣對IPO出價?!?018年5月,Spotify成為第一家直接上市掛牌的公司,這也為第二年采用同樣模式上市的Slack增加了可靠性?!斑@太簡單了?!崩锾卣f?!癝potify和Slake的做市商在IPO中的定價與開盤前的操作與做其他股票沒有任何不同?!?

      到目前為止,直接上市還沒有通過出售新發行的股票來籌集資金。雇員和風險投資人可以出售持有的股票,繼而確定股票的市場價。之后,發行主體可以重返市場,獲得在后續發行中出售的所有新發行股票的全部價值,籌集增長和償還債務所需資金。這些公司能夠在直接上市后以交易確立的全額價值來出售股票,而不是通過投資銀行抑價發行IPO籌集新資金。

      還是那個問題:為什么這么多的公司仍然采用這種效率低、費用高的老式方法上市呢?格利將IPO比作是一場婚禮,特別是那種光鮮亮麗的南部婚禮彌撒。他說:“公司所有者一生也就經歷一兩次上市。他們沒有上市的經驗,也不想承受上市過程中可能出現問題所帶來的那種焦慮感。于是,最簡單的方法就是不要惹惱任何人,一切按照傳統來?!?

      和格利一樣支持直接上市的還有著名投資銀行家弗蘭克?奎特隆、eBay總裁皮埃爾?奧米迪亞等硅谷巨頭。上市程序作為資本市場最后的精英庇護所之一,推動其實現民主化,格利的這一做法無疑是正確的。一邊是傳統,另一邊是公司所有者和雇員得以節約大量成本,以及讓市場發揮作用的基本訴求。當創始人在華爾街敲響公司掛牌上市的鐘聲時,更多的人將敲響姍姍來遲的自由的鐘聲。(財富中文網)

      譯者:Shog

      Bill Gurley is the picture of the folksy, laid-back Silicon Valley vet who's a natural at mentoring the whiz kids of tech as he lounges in his Bay Area backyard. We're speaking via Zoom late on a Tuesday afternoon, and Gurley, attired in a maroon Nike T-shirt and baseball cap, is recalling the moment that set him on a mission to fix the broken system for taking young companies public. "It was when we were planning the offering for [software provider] Elastic," recalls the venture capitalist at Benchmark who backed Uber, Zillow, and Stitch Fix. "We suddenly realized that the investment banks were way underpricing the shares, and that the market cap would jump by $70 [million] to $80 million the first day."

      Gurley was appalled that the banks were going to deliver their prized customers gigantic instant gains at the expense of owners, including Benchmark's investors. The partners held an emergency meeting and settled on a way to avoid surrendering all that "free money" to Wall Street: They requested that the investment bankers allow Benchmark itself to purchase a chunk of the new shares at the bargain price. That way, if the price bounced as they expected the first day, those original Benchmark investors who'd been funding Elastic for years would pocket the gains.

      "That's how far off the price was," says Gurley. "But would you believe it, the bankers turned us down. They refused to give us a position so they could reserve more for the mutual and hedge funds that pay them big commissions. It was then that I realized we were the patsies." As it turned out, the stock rocketed 94% on opening day, so that gains of over $200 million went to the underwriters' clients, not to original investors like Benchmark, or into the company's coffers.

      It was also the turning point that transformed the lanky legend into the venture capital world's leading crusader for a new platform for public offerings. "I already knew the system was bad and was a big fan of auctions that prevented investment banks from underpricing shares," he says. "But the Elastic experience convinced me to fight for change." Gurley asserts that any fair process for selling shares in IPOs, or all stocks, bonds, or commodities for that matter, most provide two essentials: prices established by the market, and access to all investors seeking to partake in the sale.

      The system that has reigned for many decades fails on both counts. First, prices are set not by buyers and sellers bidding freely, but by the investment banks leading the offerings. "The banks want every deal to be oversubscribed 30 to 1 when they presell the offering, meaning that just 3% of the investors who want to own shares get to buy them," says Gurley. The banks create all that extra demand by setting the price well below where they, and the institutions they're selling to, think it will open the first day. All the funds denied allocations in the underwriting phase, along with hordes of retail investors, pile in at the opening, sparking those famous "pops."

      "I hate pops," says Gurley. "You keep hearing from the investment banks that pops are a good thing, that they're a marketing event, and the business press keeps praising the big run-ups. That's ridiculous. The pops are just a sign that the shares were way underpriced." He notes that Wall Street is great at selling the IPO as image-building spectacle where CEOs get to ring the bell at the NYSE or cheer framed by their company banner on opening day.

      As for marketing and brand-building, he notes that every $20 million left on the table could buy four Super Bowl ads. The old incentive of trading a low price for a pledge of favorable coverage by the banks' all-star analysts is long gone, says Gurley. The so-called "Sptizer Rule" established in 2003 by then New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer establishes a wall between the two camps. "An investment banker needs a lawyer on the line even to talk to an analyst," says Gurley. Newly-public companies now pursue their own relationships with the analysts, he says, that are completely outside the their ties to the investment banks.

      Gurley also notes that pops are biggest when the most prestigious investment banks are leading the deals. In a presentation at a conference on reforming IPOs he sponsored in October, Gurley cited that over the past 10 years, when Goldman Sachs is head underwriter, prices spiked 33.5% on average during open day trading, and Morgan Stanley ranked second, scoring jumps of 29.2%.

      Wall Streeters frequently argue that the top investment banks secure the biggest pops because they get to take the best companies public. The idea is that the higher the quality of the company going public—and the Goldmans and Morgan Stanleys get the cream—the bigger the run-up. To Gurley, that explanation rates as surreal. "The pop is a cost of going public," he says. "Where else do you find that the highest-quality customers pay the biggest fees? Do real estate agents charge the highest commissions on the most expensive houses? Or the highest-rated bonds pay the highest yields?" He also rejects the notion that having a top name lead the offering conveys a lasting emblem of prestige. That Deutsche Morgan Grenfell, not Goldman or Morgan Stanley, led Amazon's 1997 IPO did nothing to harm its prospects. "After the offering, nobody even remembers what investment bank led the IPO," says Gurley.

      Second, investment banks deny access to all but a tiny sliver of investors seeking to purchase shares in a given IPO. "The underwriters seek to get 90% of their top clients to subscribe," says Gurley. "They reserve 65% to 70% of the shares for their 10 to 15 biggest accounts." The rest goes to 50 smaller money manager clients. Once again, even those chosen few get only 3% of the shares they want. And neither America's other 9,000 funds, nor retail investors, typically get anything. "The banks intentionally ignore the vast majority of the demand," says Gurley. It's those 10 to 15 top most prized accounts, he says, that drive the pricing. During the underwriting process, those big funds are the lowest bidders, and to please them, the investment banks set the offering price near what they want to pay. That number is often far below where the price would settle in an open auction.

      What determines which customers get the best treatment (or "which fat cats get the rich milk," as a founder of a startup that became one of 1999's biggest IPOs once told me?). The most generous allocations go to mutual and hedge funds that do their stock, bond, and commodity trading at the investment banks and pay the largest commissions. "The funds repay the banks for putting them into underpriced IPOs by paying commissions, or 'soft dollars,' far in excess of the costs of executing the stock or bond trades," says Jay Ritter, a finance professor at the University of Florida who's the leading academic expert on the workings of public offerings.

      For Gurley, the quest for reform is especially urgent right now because of a fresh flare-up in underpricing. Highlighting the trend are four deals in the first two weeks of June that left the staggering total of $1.7 billion "on the table." The extent of lowballing, and the billions investors and managers sacrificed, recalls Wall Street's feast during the tech bubble. "The stock market has been hot, which led to more IPOs," he says. "But a hot market also leads to bigger pops, which made the IPO market great again for the investment banks."

      It's important to put the costs heaped on these new offerings in perspective. The peak of IPO abuse came in 1999 and 2000, when Wall Street bestowed $30 billion and $37 billion respectively in quick profits, chiefly by underpricing tech crowd-pleasers. Based on dollar value of all the deals in those two years, the IPOs delivered average gains of 50% on their first days of trading. The volume of new offerings, and the depth of the discounts the bankers provided, shrank substantially after the frenzy ended. In 2016, for example, the U.S. saw only 75 IPOs, and total first-day jumps of merely $1.8 billion.

      Starting in 2018, the raging bull market recharged new offerings, and last year 112 recruits debuted, raising $54 billion, the biggest haul in two decades. The amount they sacrificed in debut spikes totaled $7 billion. That means Wall Street sold their shares at what amounted to a 17% markdown—costly to be sure, but way below Wall Street's 50% take during the tech bubble.

      This year, huge pops returned in force. From June 2 to June 8, Wall Street hosted four big IPOs, and all of them took scored double- or triple-digit sendoffs. ZoomInfo jumped 61%, Warner Music 31%, Shift4 Payments 46%, and Vroom 118%. All told, the big four raised $2.94 billion, and yet the shares they sold were worth $4.63 billion at the end of close of their first day as public companies. Hence, it "cost" $1.7 billion, or 63 cents for every dollar raised in forgone funds that could have gone to paying down debt or growing the business.

      Prior to that quartet of back-to-back offerings, 41 IPOs launched in 2020, and of those, another 19 popped in a big way. Those earlier offerings got an even worse deal, raising $3.324 billion, and leaving $3.1 billion on the table, for a bite of 93 cents for every dollar collected. All together, through mid-June, U.S. companies have harvested $6.3 billion and effectively handed $4.8 billion in instant profits, equivalent to 76% of the dollars raised, to funds favored by the underwriters. "The U.S. is on pace for the largest amounts left on the table since the craze of 2000," says Ritter.

      The 76% hit from underpricing isn't the sole cost to new issuers. The investment banks typically charge around 5% of the amount raised in underwriting fees. That raises Wall Street's total toll by around $300 million, to $5.1 billion. This year, the 19 companies experiencing underpricing, accounting for most of the big IPOs, are effectively paying 80 cents for every dollar raised.

      A better way to go public?

      For Ritter, the jump in the number of underpriced IPOs, and the return of gigantic pops, probably doesn't signal the Wall Street has suddenly regained the kind of power it exercised in the tech bubble. Rather, he cites a two special factors at work this year. The first is the high proportion of biopharma offerings. Through mid-June, fifteen of the nineteen deals showing the biggest one-day gains are developing advanced therapeutics or providing software for drug discovery, among them oncology specialists Black Diamond, ADC and Revolution Medicines.

      "Biotech deals are extremely hard to price because in many cases the therapies could either fail in trials or become blockbusters," says Ritter. "So given their riskiness, it's easier for the bankers to push for lower prices in the underwriting." Second, for the offerings that took off on opening day during the first two weeks in June, the bankers began negotiations when the market were reeling months earlier. "The bankers are good at managing expectations," says Ritter. "By talking about a low price in a down market, they can anchor the client's view of a fair price for going public." When stocks rebound, as they did in May and early June, the bankers can bump the price a bit, argue their raising more money for the clients, and still get the benefit of a super-pop courtesy of the new surge in optimism.

      Gurley is campaigning to replace traditional IPOs with a system that eliminates their two shortcomings. His solution would both guarantee market prices, sans pops, and grant access to any investors, big or small, that seek to purchase the shares. The solution is called "direct listing." It's similar to the "Dutch auction" platform launched by William Hambrecht, cofounder of Hambrecht & Quist. Dutch auctions, in fact, were the first free-market departure from old-fashioned IPOs. Larry Page and Sergey Brin, major proponents of reform alongside Gurley, used a Dutch auction in their public offering for Google in 2004.

      In a Dutch auction, the firm hosting the IPO uses its own proprietary software that all potential investors must access, so it can be a chore for all the funds and individuals to link to the offering site. Direct listing are also auctions. But they operate exactly like the universal process that the exchanges deploy to set opening prices every day, for every stock. For example, market makers on the NYSE such as Citadel Securities collect all the bids and ask orders prior to the start of trading and find the price "that clears the market," the price at which every share gets sold. The bidders above that price get no shares, and those below get their orders fully filled. The shares open at that market level, and don't jump because of a flood of excess orders waiting in the wings.

      "The advantage to direct listings is that every fund, and anyone with a brokerage account, can bid on an IPO just as they put in orders every day for Apple or Home Depot," says Gurley. The marquee maiden offering was Spotify's successful IPO in May 2018 and gained credibility with Slack's offering a year later. "It's so simple," says Ritter. "The marketmakers for Spotify and Slack didn't do anything different to set their price in the IPO than they do for any other stock, every day, before the opening."

      To date, direct listings haven't sold newly issued shares to raise capital. They allow employees and VC backers to sell stock and hence establish a market price. Then the issuers can go back into the market and get full value for any newly issued stock sold in a follow-on offering, raising raise cash to fund growth and repay debt. The companies get to sell shares at full value established by the trading following the direct listing, rather than raising new cash via IPOs underpriced by the investment banks.

      Still, the question remains: Why do so many companies still go public the inefficient, expensive, old-fashioned way? Gurley compares an IPO to a wedding, especially a high-gloss Southern nuptial. "The owners do it once or twice in their lifetimes," he says. "This is something they've never been through before, and they don't want to suffer the anxiety that something might go wrong. So the easy way is not to ruffle any feathers and do what's traditional."

      Joining Gurley in supporting direct listings are such Silicon Valley stalwarts as famed investment banker Frank Quattrone and eBay chairman Pierre Omidyar. Gurley is right to push for democratizing one of the last elitist refuges in the capital markets. On one side is tradition, on the other huge savings for owners and employees, and the basic appeal of letting the market do its thing. When the founders sound the opening bell on Wall Street as their stocks debut, a lot more will be sounding the bell for freedom that's long overdue.

      最新:
      • 熱讀文章
      • 熱門視頻
      活動
      掃碼打開財富Plus App
      日本免费一区,国产中文字幕乱码免费,欧美精品videossexohd,欧美VIVODESHD在线观看