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      高管何時“賣”股票,或許決定了你是賠還是賺

      高管何時“賣”股票,或許決定了你是賠還是賺

      Jeremy Kahn 2020年08月17日
      研究人員發現,被收購公司的高管在可能達成交易之前的12個月內,出售自家公司股票的行為明顯減少。

      過去六周,盡管新冠疫情仍在蔓延,并購活動卻持續復蘇。最近馬拉松原油公司以210億美元將旗下Speedway加油站業務出售給7-11母公司Seven& I Holdings,這還只是近期多筆交易中最引人注目的一筆。

      英國《金融時報》援引Refinitiv數據的分析顯示,6月30日以來至少已經出現8宗超過100億美元的交易,這是自2008年全球金融危機爆發以來,下半年開局最快的一次。

      怎么才能在下一筆巨額交易發生之前及時發現?嗯,最新研究表明,密切關注高管賣股票情況很有參考價值。

      加拿大蒙特利爾的康考迪亞大學和美國密蘇里大學的研究人員發現,被收購公司的高管在可能達成交易之前的12個月內,出售自家公司股票的行為明顯減少。

      即便收購傳言是假的,目標公司股價通常也會攀升。研究人員發現,如果某家公司可能被收購,按基準指數來算謠言首次出現后24小時內平均上漲3.72%。接下來20天里,如果傳言屬實并宣布達成交易,平均超額收益率累計可達13.92%。但即便最初的消息被澄清不實,沒有達成交易,20天后仍能獲得一點超額回報率,約1.55%。

      當然,如此一來高管就很有動力在收購傳聞泄露之前買入自家公司的股票。但在美國,高管根據重大非公開信息買賣股票屬于違法。而且,研究人員幾乎沒有發現高管公然違反法律的證據,也就是說,收購目標公司的高管通常不會在交易消息泄露前買入股票。

      但研究人員指出,根據此前發表在《歐洲金融管理》雜志(European Financial Management)并在研究資料庫SSRN上發布的一篇論文,原本打算賣出但選擇不賣并不違法。學界聲稱,收購目標公司的高管通常確實在這么做。

      研究人員調查了2002年至2011年間受收購傳聞影響的1642家美國上市公司。并購交易傳聞見諸報端的前一年,傳聞里目標公司的高管減少了賣出,以至于相比平常他們持有股票的總數平均增加了28%。

      研究人員將受并購傳聞影響與未受影響的類似公司里高管行為進行對比,得出結論:“謠言前之所以出現大量凈買入,主要因為內部人士利用了未公開信息,并非敏銳預測到股價走勢?!?/p>

      最新論文由康考迪亞大學的弗雷德里克·戴維斯、哈米德·卡迪瓦爾、托馬斯·沃克以及密蘇里大學的昆塔拉·普克特萬通共同撰寫,證實了2012年的一項類似研究。該研究針對的時間段略有不同,但同樣發現收購傳聞之前目標公司內部人士大幅減少了賣出。

      該結果也與先前研究相吻合,之前的研究顯示,往往在交易傳聞公布之前收購對象股價就開始上漲,表明交易相關信息可能已經泄露,或者內幕人士利用非公開信息交易。

      2015年的一項研究還發現,交易傳聞報道出現20天前,目標公司的短期期權交易量出現異常,可能也意味著存在內幕交易。不過同一項研究指出,研究人員發現異?;顒拥陌咐?,最終美國證券交易委員會以內幕交易提出指控的極少。

      新論文的作者寫道,研究指出內幕交易法律可能存在漏洞。文中稱,目標公司高管的行為,“(打擊了)防止內幕交易政策的精神:從重要非正式信息中獲利,既破壞了監管立法的意圖,也違背了維持投資者信心所需的道德公平概念?!?/p>

      不過,研究人員發現的現象也是一種機會。如果精明的投資者認真觀察與之前相比高管凈買入額情況,或許能提前入手下一次大收購目標公司的股票,從而大賺一筆。(財富中文網)

      譯者:Feb

      過去六周,盡管新冠疫情仍在蔓延,并購活動卻持續復蘇。最近馬拉松原油公司以210億美元將旗下Speedway加油站業務出售給7-11母公司Seven& I Holdings,這還只是近期多筆交易中最引人注目的一筆。

      英國《金融時報》援引Refinitiv數據的分析顯示,6月30日以來至少已經出現8宗超過100億美元的交易,這是自2008年全球金融危機爆發以來,下半年開局最快的一次。

      怎么才能在下一筆巨額交易發生之前及時發現?嗯,最新研究表明,密切關注高管賣股票情況很有參考價值。

      加拿大蒙特利爾的康考迪亞大學和美國密蘇里大學的研究人員發現,被收購公司的高管在可能達成交易之前的12個月內,出售自家公司股票的行為明顯減少。

      即便收購傳言是假的,目標公司股價通常也會攀升。研究人員發現,如果某家公司可能被收購,按基準指數來算謠言首次出現后24小時內平均上漲3.72%。接下來20天里,如果傳言屬實并宣布達成交易,平均超額收益率累計可達13.92%。但即便最初的消息被澄清不實,沒有達成交易,20天后仍能獲得一點超額回報率,約1.55%。

      當然,如此一來高管就很有動力在收購傳聞泄露之前買入自家公司的股票。但在美國,高管根據重大非公開信息買賣股票屬于違法。而且,研究人員幾乎沒有發現高管公然違反法律的證據,也就是說,收購目標公司的高管通常不會在交易消息泄露前買入股票。

      但研究人員指出,根據此前發表在《歐洲金融管理》雜志(European Financial Management)并在研究資料庫SSRN上發布的一篇論文,原本打算賣出但選擇不賣并不違法。學界聲稱,收購目標公司的高管通常確實在這么做。

      研究人員調查了2002年至2011年間受收購傳聞影響的1642家美國上市公司。并購交易傳聞見諸報端的前一年,傳聞里目標公司的高管減少了賣出,以至于相比平常他們持有股票的總數平均增加了28%。

      研究人員將受并購傳聞影響與未受影響的類似公司里高管行為進行對比,得出結論:“謠言前之所以出現大量凈買入,主要因為內部人士利用了未公開信息,并非敏銳預測到股價走勢?!?/p>

      最新論文由康考迪亞大學的弗雷德里克·戴維斯、哈米德·卡迪瓦爾、托馬斯·沃克以及密蘇里大學的昆塔拉·普克特萬通共同撰寫,證實了2012年的一項類似研究。該研究針對的時間段略有不同,但同樣發現收購傳聞之前目標公司內部人士大幅減少了賣出。

      該結果也與先前研究相吻合,之前的研究顯示,往往在交易傳聞公布之前收購對象股價就開始上漲,表明交易相關信息可能已經泄露,或者內幕人士利用非公開信息交易。

      2015年的一項研究還發現,交易傳聞報道出現20天前,目標公司的短期期權交易量出現異常,可能也意味著存在內幕交易。不過同一項研究指出,研究人員發現異?;顒拥陌咐?,最終美國證券交易委員會以內幕交易提出指控的極少。

      新論文的作者寫道,研究指出內幕交易法律可能存在漏洞。文中稱,目標公司高管的行為,“(打擊了)防止內幕交易政策的精神:從重要非正式信息中獲利,既破壞了監管立法的意圖,也違背了維持投資者信心所需的道德公平概念?!?/p>

      不過,研究人員發現的現象也是一種機會。如果精明的投資者認真觀察與之前相比高管凈買入額情況,或許能提前入手下一次大收購目標公司的股票,從而大賺一筆。(財富中文網)

      譯者:Feb

      The past six weeks have seen a resurgence in M&A activity, despite the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. Marathon Petroleum’s recent $21 billion sale of its Speedway gas station business to 7-Eleven parent Seven & I Holdings is just one of the most notable megadeals among a slew of recent transactions.

      No fewer than eight deals worth more than $10 billion have been announced since June 30, the fastest start to a second half of the year since before the 2008 global financial crisis, according to a Financial Times analysis of data from Refinitiv.

      How can you spot the next megadeal before it happens? Well, newly published research suggests it pays to keep careful tabs on the stock sales of top execs.

      Researchers from Concordia University in Montreal and the University of Missouri have found that the top managers at companies targeted for acquisition significantly reduced sales of their own company’s stock in the 12 months prior to the possibility of a deal surfacing.

      Shares in takeover targets typically climb on deal news, even if the rumors turn out to be false. Rumors that a firm may be purchased typically send its shares up an average 3.72% compared with the benchmark index for firms of that size in the 24 hours after the rumor first appears, the researchers found. Over the next 20 days, the cumulative average excess return is as high as 13.92% if the rumor proves true and a deal is announced. But there is still some excess return—1.55%—20 days out even if the initial report proves to be inaccurate and no deal materializes.

      This, of course, gives executives a big incentive to purchase shares in their own companies prior to any news leaks about a possible deal. But, in the U.S., it is illegal for executives to buy or sell shares on the basis of material nonpublic information. And, in fact, the researchers found little evidence that executives blatantly violate the law: Top managers at acquisition targets didn’t typically purchase more stock in the run-up to news of a possible deal leaking.

      But, the researchers note, in a paper published in the journal European Financial Management and posted to research repository SSRN earlier this week, it is not illegal to refrain from sales that would have otherwise taken place. And this, the academics claim, is exactly what top managers at target companies tend to do.

      The researchers examined 1,642 publicly traded U.S. companies that were subject to takeover rumors between 2002 and 2011. In the year prior to rumors of an M&A deal surfacing in the press, top executives at alleged takeover targets cut back on selling, to the extent that the overall number of shares they held grew on average 28% relative to their usual pattern of activity.

      By comparing this activity with those from executives in a control group of similar companies that were not subject to takeover rumors, the researchers conclude “that the high level of pre-rumor net purchasing is driven by insiders’ use of privately available knowledge, rather than an astute capacity to anticipate stock price movements.”

      This latest paper, which was cowritten by Concordia’s Frederick Davis, Hamed Khadivar, and Thomas Walker, and Missouri’s Kuntara Pukthuanthong, confirms a similar study from 2012 that looked at a slightly different time period and also found target company insiders reduced sales significantly prior to takeover rumors.

      It also comports with previous research showing stock prices in takeover targets tend to increase even prior to rumors of a deal being made public, indicating that information about a deal may be leaking, or that insiders are trading on nonpublic information.

      A 2015 study also found clear evidence of abnormal trading volumes in short-dated options of target companies in the 20 days prior to a deal rumor being reported, also indicating possible trading on inside information, although the same research noted that the Securities and Exchange Commission brought insider trading cases in very few instances in which researchers found abnormal activity.

      The new paper’s authors write that their research points to possible holes in insider trading laws. The target company executives’ activity, they write, “[strikes] at the spirit of insider trading policy: Profiting from material private information is contrary to both the stated intention of the regulatory legislation and to the implicit concept of moral fairness, which is required for investor confidence.”

      In the meantime, the phenomenon the researchers have uncovered presents an opportunity. By carefully monitoring the net purchases of top executives compared with prior periods, savvy investors may be able to scoop up shares in the next megadeal target and earn a tidy profit.

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